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Abstract 
People often think they are less biased, more rational, and less likely to conform than their peers. 
For example, research by Pronin, Berger, and Molouki (2007) found that Princeton students 
evaluated themselves as much less likely to conform compared to the average Princeton student. 
Although the results were convincing, this study was conducted using only 40 participants from 
a prestigious university, which raises potential concerns about the replicability and 
generalizability of their findings. We replicated this study in order to generalize the findings to a 
broader range of participants and use a larger sample size. We also extended the previous 
research to assess if participants would evaluate a close friend the same as the self in regard to 
perceptions of conformity. Consistent with the original study, we found that ASU students 
thought they conformed less than their peers. However, they reported that their close friend 
conformed as much as their peers. The results of our replication generalize the original findings 
to a new sample of participants and also show that this effect is specific to perceptions of the self 
vs. others and not when comparing a close friend to others. 
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Do People Really Think They are Alone in a Crowd of Sheep?  
Replication and Extension of Pronin et al. (2007) 
 Conformity plays a part in many of the decisions that people make; however, people, 
especially in Western, individualistic countries tend to view their own decision-making as robust 
against pressure to conform. Interestingly, this isn’t because people believe that conformity is 
uncommon. Indeed, in one landmark study, Pronin et al. (2007) demonstrated that people judge 
conformity as commonplace for others, but viewed themselves as uniquely unlikely to conform. 
The present study examines this intriguing asymmetry and seeks to replicate Pronin et al.’s 
research and extended it by testing an alternative explanation for the results. 
Pronin et al. (2007) conducted five studies examining whether people conform less than 
their peers. For example, their Study 2 examined how much participants thought their decision to 
purchase an item (an iPod) was influenced by social pressure relative to their peers. Overall, 
participants indicated that their decisions were less influenced than their peers. Interestingly, this 
same pattern was found regardless of whether conformity was described as a desirable or 
undesirable force influencing decisions. 
Pronin et al. (2007) explained this asymmetry by suggesting that people evaluate 
thoughts and feelings when explaining their own behavior, but use actions to explain the 
behavior for others. When people use introspection to evaluate their own behavior, they focus on 
internal thoughts and feelings and miss inaccessible and automatic influences of their behavior—
a bias referred to as the introspective illusion (Pronin & Kugler, 2007).  
Not only can the introspective illusion create differences in how much people think their 
behavior and other people’s behavior is influenced by conformity, but it contributes to the 
perception that other people are more biased than the self. Pronin, Lin, and Ross (2002) 
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identified this bias blind spot when participants compared how biased they were as compared to 
the average American. For example, people thought they were less likely to exhibit the 
fundamental attribution error, self-serving biases, and the halo effect than others. As with 
conformity, exhibiting these biases is often cognitively inaccessible (i.e. people often do not 
realize they are exhibiting the bias in question), so relying on introspection leads people to think 
they are not biased. However, because these biases are relatively well-known, people readily use 
this general knowledge when evaluating others. Again, the difference in the type of information 
people use to assess their own and other people’s behavior leads to the asymmetry in self–other 
perception (Pronin, 2008).  
It is possible that asymmetric perceptions of self and others are a result of the 
introspective illusion, but there is an alternative explanation. In Pronin et al.’s (2007) study, 
participants compared themselves (an individual) to their peers (a group). There is a large body 
of research showing that people often make different judgments about individuals and groups, 
regardless of any introspective differences (e.g., Giladi & Klar, 2002; Klar & Giladi, 1997, 1999; 
Price, Smith, & Lench, 2006). For example, Giladi and Klar (2002) had participants examine a 
group of six pleasant smelling soaps. Then, one soap was selected at random and participants 
were asked to compare the selected soap’s smell to the rest of the group. People tended to rate 
the randomly selected soap as better smelling than the group, regardless of which soap was 
chosen. Obviously, each individual from a group cannot be better than the group it is a part of 
and so presumably the effect is explained by participants focusing on the quality of the 
individualized soap and underweighting the quality of the grouped soaps. In other words, even 
though people are asked a comparative question (i.e., how pleasant is this soap relative to the rest 
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of the soaps?), they are largely answering an absolute question (i.e., how pleasant is this soap? 
see also, Klar & Giladi, 1999). 
The finding that people often focus on the target of the judgment more so than the 
comparison group provides an alternative explanation for why people tend to report they 
conform less than groups. It is possible, for example, that if people compared any individual to a 
group, they would report the individual conforms less than the group. Presumably, people would 
focus on the multitude of factors influencing the behavior of the individual and accurately 
evaluate that conformity is only one of those factors. Then, when asked to compare how much 
the individual conforms relative to the group, they will simply be answering the question about 
how much the individual conforms. Therefore, the finding by Pronin et al. (2007) might not be 
driven by the introspective illusion, but simply by the fact that people will evaluate any 
individual as conforming less than the group. 
The current study replicated Pronin et al.’s (2007) Study 2 examining perceptions of 
comparative conformity. Pronin et al.’s (2007) research is among the only to demonstrate that 
people believe that they are less susceptible to conformity than others, and their work has been 
cited hundreds of times. However, evidence for their claim rests on a small sample (N = 40) of 
highly selective participants (i.e., Princeton undergrads). Because of the small sample size, 
relatively large number of citations, and overall importance of the research, replication of this 
study seemed necessary. 
In addition to replicating their study, we also extended their research by testing a 
competing explanation. Specifically, whereas some people evaluated how much they conform 
relative to their peers, other people evaluated how much their close friend conformed relative to 
their peers. This allowed us to disentangle whether having introspective access produced the 
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asymmetry in self-other perceptions, or if it was simply the result of comparing a single target to 
a group of referents.  
For the self condition, we hypothesized that participants would rate their conformity as 
less than the average student. For the close friend condition, we hypothesized that participants 
from both the undesirable and desirable conditions would rate their conformity as similar to the 
average student. In short, we expected to replicate the results of Pronin et al. (2007), but only in 
the self condition and not in the close friend condition. 
Method 
To conduct our replication Pronin et al.’s (2007) Study 2, we followed their procedures 
using similar instructions, questions, and analyses.  Pronin et al. asked participants about 
purchasing an iPod—a product no longer being manufactured—so we updated the purchase to be 
about an iPhone.  
Participants 
 Our preregistered target sample size was 60 participants per condition (240 total). This 
would give us three times as many participants per condition as in Pronin et al.’s (2007) study. A 
total of 314 undergraduate students completed the survey for course credit. Of those, 26 
indicated they did not own an iPhone and 1 did not follow directions, leaving a final sample size 
of 287 (Mage = 19.3, SDage = 1.72, 32.4% men, 67.6% women). 
Design and Procedure 
 This study was a 2 (desirability: desirable vs. undesirable) X 2 (target: self vs. other) 
between subjects design. Participants completed this study as part of a larger survey with 
multiple unrelated studies. After receiving instructions about the study, participants were asked 
what type of phone they owned (iPhone, Android phone, don’t own a smartphone, don’t know 
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the type of phone they own). If participants indicated they own an iPhone, they continued with 
the survey; if not, they were taken directly to the demographic’s questions. Participants who 
were assigned to the close friend condition were asked to type the name or nickname of a close 
friend that they know owns an iPhone. This name was then piped into later questions asked about 
the friend. All participants then read a short paragraph—adapted form Pronin et al. (2007)—
giving possible reasons for purchasing an iPhone: 
“People are attracted to products for various reasons. Sometimes, people want a certain 
product because they really like the particular qualities that the product has to offer. For 
example, in the case of the iPhone, they might like its large memory capacity, clear 
sound, high depth camera, or sleek and modern styling.” 
The next paragraph included the same desirability manipulation used by Pronin et al. (2007). The 
socially desirable condition is underlined, and the socially undesirable condition is italicized: 
“While it is [not necessarily wrong/of course a good idea] to buy an iPhone for these 
reasons, sometimes people want certain products for more social reasons. For example, in 
the case of the iPhone, they might notice that their classmates or friends own one and that 
might affect their interest in having one. Everyday observation, and a good deal of 
psychological research, suggests that being affected by this type of social influence [is/is 
not] a good thing. [It helps us to connect with and relate to those around us. It is easier for 
us to relate to other people if we have things in common or share similar experiences./By 
leading us to follow along, it prevents us from thinking for ourselves. It may be easier to 
follow social norms, but this leads us to sacrifice our individuality.] Thus, doing 
something as simple as buying an iPhone can be a [good thing by strengthening our 
social connection with other people, and providing an additional dimension on which we 
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can communicate and share experiences./bad thing by getting in the way of our being true 
to ourselves, and leading us to go along with what those around us are doing rather than 
just being ourselves.]” 
After reading the desirability manipulation paragraph, participants were asked about the 
desirability of being influenced by social factors (“When deciding which phone to buy, how 
desirable is it for [you] [friend’s name] to be influenced by the type of phone [your] [their] 
friends or classmates own?”) on a 1 (very undesirable) to 7 (very desirable) response scale. 
Then, participants were asked about how they or their friend compares to the average 
Appalachian State University (ASU) student (“Compared to the average ASU student, how much 
was [your] [friend’s name] decision to buy an iPhone influenced by the type of phone [your] 
[their] friends or classmates owned?”) again using a 1 (much less than the average ASU student) 
to 7 (much more than the average ASU student) response scale. Finally, participants were asked 
their age, gender, and ethnicity, and then thanked for their participation.  
Results 
Self Judgments 
Social desirability. We first examined whether the desirability manipulation successfully 
influenced participants’ judgments of the desirability of being influenced by friends and 
classmates. There was a marginally significant difference between the undesirable (M = 4.58, SD 
= 1.52) and desirable (M = 4.99, SD = 1.24) conditions, t(144) = 1.74, p = .084, d = .29, showing 
that participants were slightly more likely to report conforming when it was desirable than 
undesirable.  
Perceived conformity. Next, we followed the same statistical analyses as Pronin et al. 
(2007) and examined whether participants felt they were less socially influenced than their peers 
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when buying an iPhone. A one-sample t-test revealed that, overall, participants reported they 
conformed less than their peers (M = 3.56, SD = 1.14, where 4 is “About the same as the average 
ASU student”), t(145) = 4.72, p < .001, d = .39. Although there was a marginally significant 
difference between participants’ conformity judgments in the desirable and undesirable 
conditions, t(144) = 1.74, p = .085, d = .29, participants in both the undesirable (M = 3.41, SD = 
1.30), t(78) = 4.08, p < .001, d = .46, and desirable (M = 3.73, SD = 0.90), t(66) = 2.45, p = .017, 
d = .30, conditions reported conforming less than their peers. This pattern largely replicates the 
findings by Pronin et al. (2007) that students reported conforming less than their fellow students. 
Close Friend Judgments 
Social desirability. We next examined the influence of the desirability manipulation on 
the desirability of their friend being influenced by their peers. There was not a significant 
difference between the undesirable (M = 4.84, SD = 1.52) and desirable (M = 5.01, SD = 1.62) 
conditions, t(139) = 0.67, p = .504, d = .11. This indicates that the desirability manipulation did 
not affect participants' perceptions of how desirable or undesirable it was for their friend to 
conform. 
Perceived conformity. We examined whether participants reported that their close friend 
conformed less than their friends’ peers. A one-sample t-test revealed that, overall, participants 
reported their friend conformed about the same as their peers (M = 4.01, SD = 1.31, where 4 is 
“About the same as the average ASU student”), t(140) = 0.13, p = .898, d = .01. There was not a 
significant difference between participants’ conformity judgments in the desirable and 
undesirable conditions, t(139) = 0.90, p = .373, d = .15. Participants in both the undesirable (M = 
3.91, SD = 1.22), t(66) = 0.60, p = .548, d = .07, and desirable (M = 4.11, SD = 1.39), t(73) = 
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0.67, p = .506, d = .08, conditions reported their friend conforming relatively the same compared 
to the average ASU student.  
Comparison of Self and Close Friend 
Finally, to directly compare self judgments with judgments made about their close friend, 
we conducted a 2 (desirability: desirable vs. undesirable) x 2 (target: self vs. friend) ANOVA on 
participants' comparative conformity responses (see Figure 1). This analysis revealed a 
marginally significant main effect of desirability, F(1, 283) = 3.28, p = .071, ηp2 = .011; people 
made slightly higher comparative judgments in the desirable vs. undesirable condition. There 
was also a main effect of target, F(1, 283) = 9.298, p = .003, ηp2 = .032; people gave higher 
judgments when evaluating a friend vs. self. Finally, there was not a significant interaction, F(1, 
283) = 0.198, p = .657, ηp2 = .001. 
Discussion 
 This study replicated previous research on perceptions of conformity (Pronin et al., 2007, 
Study 2). We increased the sample size and created an additional condition to evaluate 
perceptions of conformity for a close friend. We found that the results for the self condition 
replicated the results of the original study; participants evaluated themselves as conforming less 
than the average ASU student. Additionally, we found that participants were more likely to say 
that a close friend conforms about the same as the average ASU student.  
 These results confirm that when thinking of the self, people tend to assume that they 
conform less than their peers, which is most likely due to introspection illusion (Pronin & 
Kugler, 2007). Also, based on the friend condition, we can assume that the alternative 
explanation of individuals vs. groups comparisons is not affecting participants' judgments of 
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conformity. Even in the friend condition, participants still rated their friend as conforming 
similarly to peers, which means they are not evaluating the individual similarly to the self. 
 Due to the broad nature of conformity, there are some limitations of this study. This study 
is the result of one decision in one context (perceptions of conformity with the iPhone). Our 
study only replicated one of the studies by Pronin et al. (2007), but they conducted multiple 
studies in several different contexts where they evaluated perceptions of conformity. 
Additionally, both our study, and the original study, evaluated perceptions of conformity with 
college students.  
 Overall, despite limitations, our study successfully replicated the results of the previous 
study by Pronin et al. (2007). The replication and extension of our study suggests that 
introspection illusion might have an important role in perceptions of conformity when evaluating 
the self, but not others. Apparently, people really do think they are alone in a crowd of sheep. 
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Figure 1 
Comparing Conformity Responses 
 
 
